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1. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to belief dynamics Y how a rational agent ought to change
her full-beliefs after learning something new Y doxastic conservatism
seems to have a lot going for it. Information is not gratuitous, the slogan
goes, and so changes in view should always be minimal changes in view.
This is the core of conservatism, and looks like just the kind of constraint
that rationality imposes on belief revision. The conservative’s slogan is
naturally codified by requiring that revision be preservative:
PRESERVATION. If you do not believe K’ in a prior state, then
revising that state with ’ should result in a posterior state that is at least
as strong as Y carries as many commitments Y as the prior state.
And Preservation, to put it mildly, has an impressive history.1
When it comes to epistemic modals Y what, in view of the information
I have, might and must be the case Y another thesis has just as much
going for it. Suppose I am agnostic about whether it is currently raining:
neither the conclusive nor the defeasible information I have about the
current weather decides the issue of its raining outside now. If my
epistemic state is configured in this way, then, in view of what I take
myself to know, it might be raining. Conversely, if (again, in view of
what I take myself to know) it might be raining, then my epistemic state
had better be structured in something like this way Y in particular, I had
better not think it is not raining. If and only if an agent’s epistemic state
does not commit her to believing that it is not raining can we count It
might be raining as among her rational epistemic commitments Y things
her current epistemic state commits her to accepting.2 The thesis is that
rational belief is reflective in just this way:
REFLECTIVITY. Your epistemic state commits you to It might be that
p iff it does not commit you to Kp. (And dually for must).
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To the extent that we are interested in agents who can introspect their
first-order beliefs, we ought to think that something along these lines is a
hard constraint, not an optional extra, for belief revision models.
The surprising fact is that these constraints Y Preservation and
Reflectivity Y are, on pain of triviality, inconsistent: introspective agents
can’t be doxastically conservative in belief change.3 And so it looks like
we are faced with a dilemma, and must choose between being ideally
reflective and being doxastically conservative in belief revision.
In order to appreciate the proper force of the dilemma, we should be
clear at the outset about two simplifying assumptions. First, we will only
be considering the sorts of beliefs which might better be called
acceptances Y the agent in question takes herself to know something,
p, irrespective of the defeasible expectations she may have.4 Second,
although our topic is epistemic change and although we are investigating
epistemic change in the context of solipsistic epistemic modals like
might, let us assume that the impetus for such change is always non-
modal. So although agents will have epistemic commitments like It
might be raining, they only ever revise their picture of the world with
respect to Bplain facts^ like It is raining.
What makes dilemmas like this interesting Y more than a mere puzzle
Y is not the mere fact that some set of constraints, each of which we
antecedently find plausible and attractive, turns out (modulo triviality) to
be inconsistent. Nor is it interesting to learn that it is some particular
constraint that ought to go. That much follows from the inconsistency
plus some process of reflective equilibrium to find the constraint with the
least plausibility. The interest instead rides on getting the right diagnosis
of the difficulty since that, ideally anyway, buys us an explanation for
why it really is that one of the constraints is something we should never
have wanted in the first place. But without the right diagnosis, we have
little more than a puzzle.
Our triviality result leaves us but with two options: give up on ideally
reflective agents or give up on preservative belief revision. Each path is
fairly well-known Y the near-consensus is to opt for the latter at the
expense of the former.5 Preservation, I agree, is the culprit. But the
orthodox diagnosis is all wrong. I aim to set that straight.
Rationality constraints in belief dynamics Y like Preservation and
Reflectivity Y are only as good as the relations of epistemic commitment
they are built on. Such relations should a fortiori be an explicit part of
our modeling, not hidden in the background, since the properties they
have will have non-trivial effects in our revision models. It is in getting
straight about them, in the context of might and must, that we will see
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just what has gone wrong, and why we never should have wanted
Preservation in the first place.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Belief revision models should specify how agents ought to change their
beliefs in the face of new information. To formalize this, we need to
specify four things. First, what epistemic states are. Second, what the
language of Bepistemic inputs^ is, and what the language of epistemic
commitments is Y i.e., what language encodes the information which is
the impetus for epistemic change and what language encodes the
information which expresses the beliefs of the agents. These languages
may coincide, of course, but we should make room for allowing a
difference. Third, we need a canonical notion of epistemic commitment,
a relation Y i.e., a consequence relation Y that associates an epistemic
state with a set of commitments. Finally, a belief revision model must
specify a revision function, or a family of such functions, over the set of
epistemic states (with the language of epistemic inputs as domain).
Of interest to us will be models in which we insist that inputs are
confined to formulas in classical propositional logic (CPL),6 but allow
commitments to include epistemic modals like It might be raining. In
order to adequately model not only Bobjective[ beliefs Y what an agent is
committed to believing about ordinary facts Y but also what epistemic
modal commitments such an agent has in virtue of her objective beliefs,
we will need a language a bit richer than CPL. Define:
DEFINITION 2.1. Let L+ be the smallest set containing CPL such that if
’ 2 CPL, then >’, K >’ 2 L+.
Disjunction (¦) and the material conditional (Y) can be introduced in
the usual way in the classical fragment; the unary modality 5, intuitively
expressing the epistemic must, abbreviates K > K in the modal fragment.7
Given just the four broad constraints above on what it takes to be a
revision model (and some seemingly innocuous assumptions about how
they are fulfilled) plus a robust commitment to the idea that rational
agents have views on what, according to them, might and might not be
the case, it looks like we buy ourselves an awful lot of trouble. But these
broad constraints can be implemented in two ways, and the escape routes
from the trouble look a bit different in the two cases. So I will present the
problem in its normal guise first. Then I will present the problem in a
slightly different guise, one that makes clear just what I think has gone
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wrong, and will lend itself to investigating the properties of the
consequence relation implicated in the revision models.
3. ONE WAY
One way of seeing the trouble Y indeed the way one is accustomed to
seeing it Y is to view the problem BAGM-wise.[8 AGM epistemic states
(at least for our purposes) are belief sets, i.e., theories Y sets of sentences
of L+ closed under Cn. K is the set of such states. Even before saying just
which theories will counts as belief sets, and so before saying just what
the sets in K look like, we can put constraints on how an agent ought to
move from one such equilibrated state to another. Minimally, we want to
insist that revisions be successful and consistent:
AGM SUCCESS (SAGM). For any ’ 2 CPL: ’ 2K j ’.
AGM CONSISTENCY (CAGM). IfK’=2Cn(;), then K j ’ is consistent.9
(SAGM) requires that posterior states carry commitments to the
information inducing the change; (CAGM) insists that revision should
be consistency preserving and, where this does not conflict with (SAGM),
consistency restoring. These constraints are, for our purposes, back-
ground constraints on revision models Y when it comes to our dilemma,
they are non-negotiable. Preservation can be very simply put:
AGM PRESERVATION (PAGM). If K’ =2 K, then K  K j ’.
And (PAGM) is meant to codify our intuitions about information
preservation Y keep believing as much as you can after a change of view
(Harman, 1984; Gärdenfors, 1986, 1988). Together these three con-
straints form the basic kernel of the AGM theory. Thus: BThe central
rationality criterion on revisions is that the revision of K by A be the
minimal change of K that is consistent and includes A^ (Gärdenfors,
1988, p. 16). So let us call a revision model basic iff it satisfies these
three constraints.
Such constraints govern the space of revision models, saying just
which ways of moving from one equilibrated state to another ought to
count. But we have said nothing yet about the relevant sense of
equilibrium we want such states to be in. A belief set is a theory that
reflects our interest in agents who believe the (classical) consequences of
what they believe. But not just any theory will do as a belief set. In the
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case of epistemic modals, we also want agents to be introspective, their
belief sets encoding not only objective beliefs but also being closed
under what the agent considers a serious possibility Y under what, in
view of what she believes about the objective facts, might and might not
be the case.
DEFINITION 3.1. (Levi (1979); Fuhrmann (1989)). Let K be a belief set
and ’ be any formula in CPL. Then Poss(K) is the smallest set such that:
(1) if ’ 2 K, then 5’ 2 Poss(K); and
(2) if K’ =2 K, then >’ 2 K.
An AGM belief set K is closed under Poss iff Poss(K)  K.
Reflectivity can now be put as the constraint that K contains only
Poss-closed belief sets:
AGM REFLECTIVITY (RAGM). K 2 K only if K is closed under Poss.
Finally, let us say that an AGM revision model is trivial iff every state
in the model is fully opinionated about objective matters of fact, ruling
out objective uncertainty altogether. And so a model is non-trivial just in
case it does not rule out such uncertainty:
AGM NON-TRIVIALITY (NTAGM). There is a belief set K 2 K and
’ 2 CPL such that ’ =2 K and K’ =2 K.
The Fuhrmann triviality result is just this. If an AGM revision model
concerns only belief sets which are closed under Poss and that model
satisfies the Gärdenfors idea of the core, then that model must be trivial
in the sense that it requires that rationality rules out uncertainty. Put a
slightly different way, there is no non-trivial revision model faithful to
both the Gärdenfors idea of the core and the idea of ideally reflective
agents.10
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Fuhrmann (1989)). If K; ?h i is basic, it is trivial.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. By (NTAGM), there is a ’ 2 CPL and a K
such that ’ =2 K and K’ =2 K. Now, Poss(K)  K and hence >K’ 2 K.
Consider K j ’. Since K’ =2 K, by (PAGM) K  K j ’. So, since >K’ 2
K, >K’ 2 K j ’. By (SAGM), ’ 2 K j ’. And so, by closure under
Poss, 5’ 2 K j ’. K j ’ is thus inconsistent, whence by (CAGM) it
follows that K’ 2 Cn(;). But all belief sets are closed under Cn, so K’
must be in K. Contradiction. 5
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4. ANOTHER WAY
The tradition is to pose this problem about epistemic modals AGM-wise.
But this hides an important element in the background. One score on
which we hope a belief revision model to inform us is what the relation
of epistemic commitment is, and how sets of commitments generated by
that relation undergo changes as agents learn new things. Rather than
keeping such a relation lurking in the background, let’s bring it to the
fore and see what its properties ought to be. That’s the second way of
seeing the trouble about epistemic modals.
As before, we need suitable concepts of epistemic states, and of the
right kind of relations of epistemic commitment. Intuitively, we can
think of an epistemic state as a pair: a set of possible worlds constituting
(a subset of) the space of possibilities, and an ordering of implausibility
over the space of possibilities (Grove, 1988; Spohn, 1988). In such
models the kinematics of the revision function over epistemic states is
determined largely by the properties of the ordering. For our purposes
here, however, we will assume very little about the structure of revision
functions, and so we need not specify the nature of the orderings in any
detail. In fact, for now at least, we can take epistemic states simply to be
subsets of the space of possible worlds. Call such states basic states.
DEFINITION 4.1 (BASIC STATES). Fix a space W of possible worlds.
s is a basic epistemic state iff s  W. I is the set of such s’s.
Clearly these states have no expressive advantage over belief sets Y
there is an obvious mapping between the AGM representation and this
one. But thinking of epistemic states as sets of worlds does make it plain
that the relation between states and sets of commitments Y a consequence
relation for our chosen language Y does quite a lot of the heavy lifting in
a belief revision model. And that is where I think we will make some
progress.
So we will only be concerned with the class M of revision models (for
L+) that take I as the set of epistemic states. We also need to specify the
kinds of commitment relations, the kinds of consequence relations î  I
 L+, that will concern us and constrain our revision functions by
appealing to rationality postulates that implicate them. (Of course, such
constraints will represent a significant interaction between the revision
function and the commitment relation.) But even before saying anything
at all about what kinds of consequence relations will enter into our
models, and so without saying exactly what models make up M, we can
constrain the models by constraining how agents ought to move from one
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equilibrated state to another, by insisting that our revision functions ) be
successful and consistent. Success is transparent:
SUCCESS (S). For any s 2 I, ’ 2 CPL: s ) ’ î ’.
A basic state s will carry with it a set of commitments Y formulas ’ 2
L+ such that s î ’. And such a state will be consistent just in case that
set of commitments is. So whether a state is consistent or not is
parametric on our choice for a consequence relation, for it is only with
respect to such a choice that a state carries any set of commitments Y
consistent or otherwise Y at all.
DEFINITION 4.2. Fix a consequence relation î  I  L+. A state s is
inconsistent (with respect to î), s = ±, iff for some ’ 2 L+ it is the case
that s î’ and s î K’. Otherwise s is consistent.
And now we can insist that revision be consistency preserving:
CONSISTENCY (C). For any s 2 I, ’ 2 CPL: if g’Ä m ;, then s ) ’ m ±.
As before, these two constraints are non-negotiable. Preservation just
is the thought that, in the limiting case of revision, prior commitments
should be included in posterior commitments. Letting Bs = {’ 2 L+ : s î
’}, this becomes:
PRESERVATION (P). For any s 2 I, ’2 CPL: if s^ K’ then Bs  Bs)’.
But not just any revision model over I will do Y we are interested in
models for introspective agents, and so we need to select models with
reasonable consequence relations. Partition an agent’s commitments in a
given state into those expressible in CPL and those that are only
expressible in L+. With respect to CPL, we want rational commitment to
be identified with classical satisfaction. With respect to the modal
fragment, we want agents to be ideally reflective about what might and
might not be the case, in view of their commitments expressible in CPL.
Might is a reflective or autoepistemic modality, and we expect rational
agents to have epistemic commitments which are reflective in this way
about basic, non-modal commitments.
DEFINITION 4.3. Let gIÄ be the classical interpretation function over
CPL. A relation î  I  L+ is basically reflective iff, for any ’ 2 CPL and
 2 L+:
(1) s  g’Ä iff s î ’;
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(2) if s î’, then s î 5’;
(3) if s ^K’, then s î >’;
(4) if gÄ = gÄ, then s î  iff s î  [/], where  [/] is  with zero
or more occurrences of  in  replaced by .
Being basically reflective brings some nice properties in its wake:
such relations are supraclassical over the non-modal fragment, and in the
modal fragment they are reflective about those non-modal commitments.
Here is a contrived sort of example of such a relation:
EXAMPLE 1 (BASIC COMMITMENT). Let s be any state in I, ’ be
any formula in CPL, and  be any formula in L+. Let Ks be the smallest set
such that:
(1) s  g’Ä iff ’ 2 Ks;
(2) if ’ 2 Ks, then 5’ 2 Ks;
(3) if K’ =2 Ks, then >’ 2 Ks;
(4) if gÄ = gÄ, then  2 Ks iff  [/] 2 Ks.
Let the basic commitment relation î+  I  L+ be specified as
follows: s î+’ iff ’ 2 Ks.
This relation really is contrived: all we have done is take a state and
form a stable autoepistemic theory (in L+) from it, and then define a
consequence relation in terms of that autoepistemic theory.11 Clause (1)
ensures that that relation respect CPL with respect to the non-modal
fragment. Clause (4) ensures that, inside the scope of the might operator,
truth-functionally equivalent subformulas can be swapped. And clauses
(2) and (3) track closure under Poss.
There are three natural desiderata that we might want met when we
are thinking about modeling rational belief in the context of reflective
modalities. We want to make sure our chosen consequence relation
predicts that the epistemic modals really are reflective, that it predicts
that agents are completely opinionated about what might and might not
be the case (in view of the information they have), and we want it to
predict that commitment with respect to the modals is entirely grounded
in objective beliefs, in the sense that any two (consistent) states which
share exactly the same objective beliefs share exactly the same
commitments. In turn:
PROPOSITION 4.1. Letî be a basically reflective relation, and s, s0 be
any states in I. Then:
(1) If s m ±, then s î 5’ iff s î ’.
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(2) For any ’ 2 CPL, either s î >’ or s î K >’.
(3) Let s, s0 be any consistent states. If {’ 2 CPL : s î ’} = {’ 2 CPL :
s0 î ’}, then {’ 2 L+ : s î ’} = {’ 2 L+ : s0 î ’}.
Proof.
(1) For the left-to-right direction, suppose (toward a reductio) that s î
5’ but s ^ ’. Since s ^ ’ it follows that s î >K’, and so { : s
î  } is inconsistent, and so s = ± after all-completing the
reductio. For the other direction, suppose s î ’. And so clearly
s î 5’, as required.
(2) Consider any ’ 2 CPL. Clearly, either s  gK’Ä or s = gK’Ä.
Suppose the former. Then s î K’, and so s î K>KK’, i.e., s î
K>’. So suppose the latter. If s = gK’Ä, then s ^ K’, and so s î
>KK’, i.e., s î >’.
(3) Here we show that {’ 2 L+ : s î ’}  {’ 2 L+ : s0 î ’} (the
other direction being symmetric). The modal fragment only
contains formulas of the form >’ and K>’, and so we have two
cases to consider. For the first case, suppose that s î >’. Since s m
±, s ^ K >’, i.e., s ^ 5K’. And so, since î is basically reflective,
s ^ K’. But s and s0 support all and only the same CPL formulas, so
s0 ^ K’. Hence s0 î >KK’, i.e., s0 î >’. Now, for the second
case, suppose s0 ^ K>’, that is, that s0 ^ 5K’. So, given that î is
basically reflective, s0 ^ K’. Thus, since s and s0 support all and
only the same objective formulas, s ^ K’. It then follows that s î
>’. And since s m ±, we have that s ^ K >’, as required. 5
Definition 4.3 does what we wanted: we want to insist that agents are
reflective about what plain facts they are and are not committed to. And
this makes the class of revision models with basically reflective
commitment relations of interest.
Now we can see the problem posed by epistemic modals. Suppose, as
before, that the only impetus for epistemic change is expressible in non-
modal language: that is, let us restrict our attention to revision functions
which take states and formulas of CPL to states. And suppose we only
consider models in which the revision function takes states in I and
formulas of CPL to states. Consider the class of revision models (for L+)
that are built from basically reflective relations between states and
commitments. That is, we insist that
REFLECTIVITY (R). A revision model M = bI, ), îÀ is in M only if î
is basically reflective.12
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Say that a model is basic iff it satisfies (S), (C), and (P); and call it
trivial iff every state in the model is fully opinionated about objective
matters of fact. And so a model is non-trivial just in case it does not rule
out such uncertainty:
NON-TRIVIALITY (NT). For some s 2 I, ’ 2 CPL: s ^ ’ and s ^ K’.
Fuhrmann’s Impossibility Theorem can now be stated rather simply:
being a basic model in M entails being trivial.
PROPOSITION 4.2. Let M be any model in M. If M is basic, then M is
trivial.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. By (NT), there is an s and ’ (in CPL) such
that s ^ ’ and s ^ K’. Since î is basically reflective, it follows that s
î >K’. Consider s ) ’. By (S), s )’ î ’. Since s ^ K’, by (P) we
have that { : s î  }  { : s )’ î  }. Hence, since s î >K’, s ) ’
î >K’. But since s ) ’ î ’, we know that s ) ’ î 5’. Thus { : s )
’ î  } is inconsistent, and so s ) ’ = ±. By (C) it follows that gK’Ä =
W. Since î is supraclassical it then follows that s î K’. Contradiction.
5
Triviality results like this need escape routes. There are some obvious
nonstarters, but given that (S) and (C) are nonnegotiable, our options are
rather constrained: give up on ideally reflective agents by giving up (R)
or give up on preservative belief revision by giving up (P). Orthodoxy
tells us to hold on to (R) at the expense of (P). But the orthodox case for
this is all wrong.
Before getting to that, however, consider a strategy for retaining
Preservation at the expense of Reflectivity.13 Levi denies that we ever
have beliefs of the form It might be that p. Strictly speaking, the story
goes, we have beliefs which are truth-evaluable (expressible in CPL) and
then we have judgments of serious possibility (expressible only in the
modal fragment). The former are contained in an agent’s corpus of
beliefs, whereas the latter are confined to the agent’s meta-corpus (an
AGM-style belief set which is closed under Poss). Beliefs and judgments
of serious possibility are not of the same ilk, and so it is just confused to
insist that an agent’s beliefs are introspective in the way that Reflectivity
seems to require.
When the Fuhrmann result is put AGM-wise, it is easy enough to see
how Levi’s way out does indeed provide a way out Y he denies (RAGM)
by denying that such modal commitments can belong to corpora in the
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first place (Levi, 1988, pp. 56Y58). They are commitments Y agents in a
given state are committed to judging this or that as seriously possible; it
is just that those commitments expressing those judgments are not real
beliefs, and so don’t enter into the constraints on the revision functions
in our models.14
But this reason for rejecting Reflectivity will not help at all for the
version of the trouble I am most concerned with. The tension the
Fuhrmann result brings out Y witness the second way of seeing the trouble
Y is independent of any important distinction between an agent’s beliefs
and her other epistemic commitments. Perhaps only some of an agent’s
commitments can be properly called Bbeliefs^, and maybe those are just
those that Levi would be happy attributing to an agent’s corpus. But it
does not really matter. Our constraints have not made mention of beliefs
at all, but have instead been about how epistemic states (sets of worlds)
and an agent’s rational commitments in those states (determined by a
consequence relation between states and formulas in our modal
language) interact with a revision operator. And Levi clearly and rightly
recognizes that there are rationality constraints on how states commit
agents to judgments of serious possibility, namely, that those judgments
ought to be reflective in the way that Definition 4.3 says they are. What
Proposition 4.2 shows is that this concession, in the presence of our other
assumptions, is enough to get the triviality result, if not for an agent’s
beliefs, then for the class of her epistemic commitments. So, quite apart
from how we may want to further subdivide the class of epistemic
commitments, christening some Bbeliefs^ and others Bjudgments of
serious possibility^, rejecting reflectivity in this way is not going to do
the trick.15
Orthodoxy, on the other hand, wants no part of denying that agents’
corpora can contain proper beliefs which bear epistemic modals.16 So
suppose we resolve the problem in favor of rational commitment being
systematically autoepistemic at the expense of Preservation. Then the
claim is that we have a choice to make since Preservation is entailed by
two near-platitudes about belief dynamics.
Suppose we think that revisions go by way of (some version or other
of) the Levi IdentityVrevision with respect to ’ decomposes: first take
the minimal weakening of that state to give up of the commitment to K’,
then expand the resulting state with respect to ’. A minimal weakening
of a state with respect to ’ should be the minimal change to that state
such that in the resulting state the agent is no longer committed to ’.17
And suppose that weakening idles on non-belief: if a state does not
commit an agent to ’ then weakening that state with respect to ’ should
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produce no change at all. The orthodox diagnosis notes that these
constraints jointly entail (PAGM), and so we have to give up either the
Levi Identity or the vacuity constraint on weakenings.18 There are, it
turns out, two senses of Bweakening[. One, a Bmind-opening^ sense, is
tied-up with the Levi Identity-weakening a state with respect to K’ in
order to take on the commitment with respect to ’. But there is also a
Bminimal loss^ sort of weakening, and this is the sort that the vacuity
constraint is about. The theorem points to a tension between the two
senses. It is hard to muster enthusiasm for getting rid of the minimal loss
kind, so the Levi Identity has to go. Put another way, the diagnosis is that
the impossibility result turns on a subtle equivocation about epistemic
weakenings, and it is only the minimal loss sense which should have any
purchase on our intuitions.
But this diagnosis is wide of the mark, the Levi Identity and
equivocations on Bweakening[, it will turn out, are red herrings.
Orthodoxy has it right that Preservation is the culprit here, but it gets
the diagnosis wrong and so mislocates what is pressing about the
Fuhrmann resulzt.
5. PRESERVATION AND PERSISTENCE
Preservation Y and so both (PAGM) and its more model-theoretic
counterpart (P) Y is meant to capture some sort of information economy
principle. But, and this is most clearly seen in (P), such a principle is
only as good as the consequence relation upon which it is based.
Glossing quite a bit, what we will see is that the Levi Identity just is not
an important player in our drama. Instead it is the connection between
rationality constraints Y (P) in particular Y and consequence relations that
is most important. And this dependence runs deep Y (P) is forced on us
(plus or minus just a bit), if only the consequence relation has a certain
structure. And so giving up (P) will require moving away from
consequence relations with that certain structure. If we are lucky, we
will have independent reason to move away from such relations in the
first place. If we are very lucky, we can find an independently motivated
consequence relation that predicts exactly the shortcomings of those with
the problematic structure. I will make a case for thinking we are lucky in
this section, and for our being very lucky in the next.
Now we have to make the gloss precise. First, nothing at all turns on
whether we talk about weakenings (as orthodoxy does) or revisions (as I
have). Each way has its own constraint on vacuous changes in view, and
each has a (well-known) way of representing the other. At a minimum,
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let us require that a downdating function, ,: I  CPL Y I, weakens
commitments by increasing a state: s  s , ’. To require that downdates
idle on non-belief, and that seems a platitude, is to require that they
satisfy Easy Weakening:
DEFINITION 5.1 (EASY WEAKENING). Let M be a revision model
for L+. M satisfies easy weakenings (EW) iff for any s 2 I and ’ 2 CPL: if
s ^ ’ then s , ’ = s.
The Levi Identity requires revision to decompose into a downdate
followed by an update:
DEFINITION 5.2 (LEVI IDENTITY). Let M = bI, î, )À be a revision
model for L+, and , a downdating function. M satisfies the Levi Identity
(LI) iff: for any s 2 I and ’ 2 CPL, s ) ’ = (s , K’) 7 g’Ä.19
Just as there is an easy (limit) case of weakening, there is an easy
(limit) case of revision. Suppose we want to revise our view of the world
to take on a commitment which is fully compatible with our prior view.
In such fortunate circumstances, the revision should reduce to just a
simple sort of learning:
DEFINITION 5.3 (EASY REVISIONS). Let M = bI, î, )À be a revision
model for L+. M satisfies easy revisions (ER) iff: for any s 2 I and ’ 2
CPL, if s ^ K’ then s ) ’ = s 7 g’Ä.
(LI) informs us of one direction of fit that might obtain between
revision functions and operations of epistemic weakening. Indeed, it is
what allows one to construct a revision function on the basis of a
construction for weakenings. But one might just as well go the other
direction, starting with a revision function and defining downdates in
terms of it. This direction for the link between revision and downdates is
known, in the belief revision lore, as the Harper Identity:
DEFINITION 5.4 (HARPER IDENTITY). Let M = bI, î, )À be a
revision model for L+. Where , is a downdating function, M satisfies the
Harper Identity (LI) iff: for any s 2 I and ’ 2 CPL, s , ’ = s ? (s ) K’).
There is a close, and well-known, relationship between these two
casts of characters: assuming (LI), (EW) implies (ER); and assuming
(HI), (ER) implies (EW).20 So there is a broad and natural sense in which
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our constraints on easy weakenings and easy revisions come to just the
same thing. For completeness, I will reproduce the facts here:
PROPOSITION 5.1. Let M = bI, î, )À be a revision model for L+. If M
satisfies (LI) then it satisfies (EW) only if it satisfies (ER). And if M
satisfies (HI) then it satisfies (ER) only if it satisfies (EW).
Proof. Assume M satisfies (LI) and (EW). Suppose s^K’, and con-
sider s ) ’. By (LI), s ) ’ = (s , K’) 7 g’Ä. But, by (EW), (s , K’) = s,
and so s ) ’ = s 7 g’Ä.
Now assume that M satisfies (HI) and (ER). Suppose s ^ K’, and
consider s , K’. By (HI), s , K’ = s ? (s ) ’). But, by (ER), s ) ’ =
s 7 g’Ä, and so s , K’ = s. 5
The orthodox diagnosis has it that (P) is entailed by (LI) and (EW).21
But this just is not so. Here is a simple counter-model. Take the (ad-
mittedly contrived) relation î+ from Example 1.22 Suppose s = {w1, w2}
such that p is the case at w1 but not at w2. Clearly s ^+K p. So, assuming
both (LI) and (EW), s ) p = s 7 gpÄ = {w1}. But while s î+ >K p, not so
for the posterior: s ) p = {w1} ^+ >K p. And this violates (P).
Fuhrmann and I agree on the culprit Y it is (P) Y but disagree on the
mastermind. It is not (LI), so let us look more closely at the properties
our consequence relations bear. Suppose we adopt (ER), a transparent
property for vacuous revision. Then (P) will be satisfied by revision
models in which the consequence relation is, in the sense defined below,
persistent.23
DEFINITION 5.5 (PERSISTENCE). Fix a consequence relation î  I
 L for a language L. A formula ’ 2 L is persistent with respect to î iff
for any s, s0 2 I: if s î ’ and s0  s, then s0 î ’. The relation î is
persistent iff all formulas in L are persistent with respect to it.
PROPOSITION 5.2. Let M = bI, î, )À be any revision model for L+. If
î is persistent and M satisfies (ER), then M satisfies (P). As a corollary:
if î is persistent and M satisfies (LI) and (EW), then M satisfies (P).
Proof. Suppose the hypothesis, and consider any ’ 2 CPL such that
s ^ ’. By (ER), s ) ’ = s 7 g’Ä. Now consider any 2 L+ such that s î
 . We have to show that s ) ’ î  . But since s ) ’ = s 7 g’Ä, it follows
that s ) ’  s. Whence it follows by the persistence of î that s ) ’ î
 . Thus, { : s î  }  { : s ) ’ î  }, as required. The corollary then
follows immediately by Proposition 5.1. 5
ANTHONY S. GILLIES130
The assumption that the consequence relation is persistent is critical.
We showed that (LI) and (EW) do not jointly entail (P) by exploiting î+
(from Example 1). A bit of checking verifies that such a relation is not,
in fact, persistent.
So, in the presence of a near-platitudinous constraint on easy
revisions, persistence of the consequence relation forces (P) upon us.
And although (P) is meant to capture intuitions about the rationality of
information economy, in the context of epistemic modals it carries
implausible predictions. For suppose that my state is characterized by
just two possibilities, w1 and w2, such that p is the case at the first but not
the second of these. It seems clear that in such a state I am committed to
>K p, and any suitably reflective consequence relation will bear this out.
In such a state, moreover, I am not committed to K p. Now consider the
set of commitments after I revise this state with the new fact that p.
Should it contain, properly or otherwise, the set of commitments from
the earlier state? (P) requires it, but this is certainlynotacceptable, for in the
prior state I was committed to >K p but in the posterior state I had better
not be, lest my commitments run inconsistent (assuming that commit-
ment is suitably reflective I will have a posterior commitment to K >K p).
So we should not have wanted (P) in the first place. But, given that (ER)
and persistence entail (P), we cannot jettison (P) without also abandoning
either (ER) or the persistence of our chosen consequence relation.
This may seem an uncomfortable choice since (ER) seems utterly
obvious and persistence generally makes for well-behaved notions of
consequence. But we are lucky. We have independent reason to think
that insisting on persistent relations of rational commitment is a bad idea.
The argument parallels the one above: an agent in the state s = {w1, w2},
where p is true at w1 but not at w2, ought to be committed to >K p. But an
agent who has properly more information, say an agent in state s0 =
{w1}, clearly ought not be so committed. And this fact Y a fact that has
more to do with the structure of rational belief than it does about the
structure of rational belief dynamics Y is squarely at odds with the
constraints placed on us by a persistent consequence relation.24
I agree that (P) is the culprit in the impossibility result, but the
mastermind is not as orthodoxy would have us believe. The trouble is
with persistence. It is a persistent relation of epistemic commitment, not
the Levi Identity plus some platitudes about vacuous changes in view,
that commits us to (P) and its implausible predictions. And we have
reason apart from issues in belief dynamics to demand a different kind of
consequence relation to model rational epistemic commitment in a
satisfactory way anyway. Moreover, this diagnosis offers a unified
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explanation of the trouble: the reasons for rejecting (P) are completely
seamless with the reasons for rejecting persistence as a property of
rational commitment in the context of the autoepistemic might.
6. EPISTEMIC COMMITMENT
Rationality constraints like (P) are only as good as the consequence
relations they implicate. Assuming some near-platitudes about vacuous
changes in view, a poor choice of a consequence relation Y opting for a
persistent one in modal contexts Y straightaway leads to triviality. We do
have an example of a non-persistent relation (î+) but it is, to say the
least, inelegant. We can do better. And doing better will pay off: once we
get such a consequence relation, it is easy to see how to couple it with
virtually any off-the-shelf story about revision functions to get a non-
trivial model with modal commitments.
The most obvious model for epistemic commitment is the
Bpropositional containment^ analysis. The idea for the non-modal
fragment is familiar: a state s commits an agent to ’ just in case s 
g’Ä. For in that case the information that ’ carries is already present in
s. But this is a story that can equally well be told by appeal to a fixed-
point: s commits an agent to ’ iff adding the information that ’ carries
to s would induce no change at all. If we think that adding the
information of a non-modal ’ goes by way of intersection with g’Ä, this
is just to require that s 7 g’Ä = s. And, of course, in that case our two
stories coincide since s 7 g’Ä = s iff s  g’Ä.
To extend this story to reflective modals, the most natural path would
seem to be to generalize the notion of a B’-world^ so that we can pick
out, in addition to ’-worlds, the worlds where ’ might be the case, the
set of >’-worlds. But there is an apparent catch: there seems to be no set
answering to the description Bset of worlds where ’ might be the case^.
For suppose otherwise. Take again a state s containing just two
possibilities, w1 and w2, where the first is a p-world and the second is
not. Then an agent in s ought to be committed to >p. But that means that
both w1 and w2 are in the set of >p-worlds. In particular, w2 must be.
Now add the information that K p to s. This ought result in s0 = {w2}, a
state that surely does not carry >p as a commitment. But in that case w2
had better not be in the set of >p-worlds, which is rather unfortunate
since we already decided otherwise. Contradiction.
Now, what this simple argument does not do Y and is not intended to
do Y is give a general proof that epistemic modals do not express
propositions in the normal sense. But what it definitely does do is
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provide a little motivation for thinking about commitment in a slightly
different way. The intuition that it is pumping is that epistemic modals
tell us more about an agent’s information she has about the world than it
does about the world itself.25 And so by generalizing what exactly we
mean by Bthe information a modal carries^, we can bootstrap our way
into a story about commitment. The general idea Y not a new one, but
new to this way of thinking about problems in the dynamics of belief Y is
to identify the information that ’ carries with the potential that ’ has to
change a state if we update that state with ’. Updating is meant here to
be simple-minded: it corresponds to the simplest kind of epistemic
change in which new information is added without any safeguards to
prevent collapse into inconsistency.26 So the information that ’ carries
is its update-profile. What is left is to define the update function.
Up to this point I have been content to follow tradition and focus
on epistemic modalities which are restricted to depth at most one. But
this restriction is not obviously required, and a more elegant account
of commitment should be able to do without it. Let’s now lift this
restriction.
DEFINITION 6.1. Let L> be the smallest set including CPL and such that
if ’,  2 L> then K’, (’ $  ), >’ 2 L>.
As before, disjunction, the material if then, and the box for must are
introduced in the usual way. Clearly, L+Î L>, so any commitment
relation for the latter is also a commitment relation for the former.
The general idea is alarmingly simple. Assume that updating is a
species of simple-minded learning: no care is taken to prevent collapse
into inconsistency. But remember that we are also thinking of might as
both subjective and solipsistic: it is telling us more about an agent’s
information she has than it is about the world directly. Then updating a
state with a modal like It might be raining should either do nothing to
that state (if, in view of the information in that state, it really might be
raining) or else reduce that state to absurdity (if, in view of the
information in that state, it is not raining).27 Generalizing things a bit:
DEFINITION 6.2. Let s be any state in I, p be any atom, and ’,  be
any formulas in L>. The basic state update function, j: I  L> Y I is
defined by the following recursion:
(1) s j p = {w 2 s : w 2 gpÄ}
(2) s j K’ = s \ (s j ’)
(3) s j (’ $  ) = (s j ’) j  
(4) s j >’ = {w 2 s : j ’ m ;}
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Updating a state with an atom p just eliminates from that state all not-
p possibilities. Negation is just set subtraction: updating with K’
eliminates from a state just those possibilities which would survive an
update with ’. Conjunction is functional composition, i.e., it amounts to
a sequential update, taking the conjuncts in order. And updating with
might invites a test of a state s, returning either all of s (if the test is
successful) or none of it (if it is not).
This more generalized update function on epistemic states has some
interesting properties. For our purposes the point is that it does not at all
have the same (trivial) dynamic properties that gIÄ has, and so when we
use it to define a commitment relation we will get something much
better.
DEFINITION 6.3. f, a function on sets with domain X, is eliminative
with respect to a structure bX, eÀ iff for any x 2 X: f (x) e x. f is
distributive (or continuous) over X iff for any x 2 X: ?a2x f({a}) = f(x),
PROPOSITION 6.1. The update function j is eliminative with respect to
bI, À but is not distributive over I.
Proof. A routine induction suffices to show that j is eliminative with
respect to bI, À. To see that j does not distribute over I, let s = {w1, w2}
where w1 2 gpÄ but w2 =2 gpÄ. Then s j >p = {w 2 s : s j p m ;}, that is s j
>p = s. Now, {w1} j >p = {w1} but {w2} j >p = ;. Thus, s j >p m ?w2s
{w} j >p. 5
That j is not distributive, and that the failure surrounds the behavior
of the modals, means that those modals express non-local properties of
epistemic states. By way of contrast, gIÄ is distributive. And this reflects
the kind of trouble we saw above in trying to get a handle on a set
answering to the description Bthe set of >’-worlds^. Our reasons for
thinking there is no such set to be found were just that might expresses a
global property of a state, and those are just the kinds of properties that
gIÄ is insensitive to. Since we are thinking of commitment as a fixed-
point of the update function, the nondistributivity of the latter will have
dynamic effects on former.
DEFINITION 6.4 (COMMITMENT). Let ’,  be any formulas in L>.
Then:
(1) An agent in s is committed to ’, s í ’, iff s j ’ = s.
(2) ’ entails  , ’ í  , iff for any s : s j ’ í  .
(3) ’ and  are equivalent, ’ S  , iff for any s : s j ’ = s j  .
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This way of relating states to commitments is basically reflective. In
fact, we can say something a bit stronger: í is completely reflective Y
it’s reflectivity does not respect the boundaries between the modal
formulas and the non-modals.28
DEFINITION 6.5. A relation î  I  L> is completely reflective iff for
any s 2 I:
(1) for any ’ 2 CPL, s î ’ iff s  g’Ä;
(2) for any ’ 2 L>, if s î ’ then s î 5’;
(3) for any ’ 2 L>, if s ^ ’ then s î >K’.
PROPOSITION 6.2. í is completely reflective.
Proof.
(1) First, note that for any ’ 2 CPL, s j ’ = s 7 g’Ä, s í ’ iff s j ’ =
s. Since s j ’ = s 7 g’Ä in this case, we have that s j ’ = s iff s 7
g’Ä = s, i.e., iff s  g’Ä.
(2) Suppose s í ’. Thus s j ’ = s. But note that s í 5’ iff s j 5’ =
s, i.e., iff {w 2 s : s j ’ = s} = s, and this iff s j ’ = s, as required.
(3) Suppose s ] >K’. (We need to see that s í ’.) So s j >K’ m s.
That is, {w 2 s : s j K’ m ;} m s, which implies that s j K’ = ;.
Whence it follows that (s \ (s j ’)) = ;, and hence s j ’ = s. And
so s í ’. 5
COROLLARY 6.3. í is basically reflective.
So í is reflective about commitments expressible in CPL and com-
pletely opinionated about what might and might not be the case
(according to a given state). And it is genuinely a dynamic consequence
relation: the non-distributivity of the update function makes í non-
persistent.
PROPOSITION 6.4. í is not persistent.
Proof. Let s = {w1, w2} where w 2 gpÄ and w2 =2 gpÄ. Then s í >p
since s j p m ;. Now consider s0 = s j Kp = {w2}. s0 j p = ; and so s0 j >p
= ;. Thus s0 ] >p even though clearly s0 Î s, violating persistence. 5
Non-persistence has the consequence that entailment defined via í is
not reflexive Y for some choices of ’ 2 L> we have that ’ ] ’. For let
’ = >p $ Kp and consider an s like that in the proof above. But, you
might say, surely this is a mistake!
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It isn’t, and the reason why it isn’t reveals something significant.
Reflexivity of a consequence relation is intimately tied to both persistence
and the properties of our update function. Our chosen consequence re-
lation is defined as a fixed-point of our chosen update function. And our
chosen update function is not distributive Y it is the modals that are
responsible for this. That means that the test-like behavior of the modals,
whether or not they are supported in a state, is a global property of the
state. Since we have taken to thinking of conjunction as functional
composition we have allowed for the possibility that two conjuncts might
introduce different information into a state. And that is just the possibility
that gets exploited by formulas like >p$K p. The first conjunct invites a
global test on a state which, if passed, gets undercut by the second
conjunct.
So there is something distinctive about formulas like >p$K p.
Distinctive, but not defective. We might very easily define a concept
of consistency as follows: ’ 2 L> is consistent iff there is a state s 2 I
such that s j ’ m ;.29 Inconsistency is certainly the mark of
defectiveness. But the case we have been considering is not of this sort
at all. Suppose I have yet to open the blinds on a particular morning in
London. Given the facts I have, I believe that it might be raining out.
Then I open the blinds to see that it isn’t raining at all. Assuming that we
are content enough to treat sequences of sentences as cases of inter-
sentential conjunction, then we have just the sort of situation we are
after: I first believe >p and then, after learning that Kp, I update
accordingly. But notice that this required me to have acquired a bit of
new information along the way. This looks to be a case of monotonic
information growth of the simplest kind and so should not be lumped
with either a proper revision or with the inconsistent formulas.
But we do have the expressive resources to mark the distinctive feature
we are after, neither lumping >p$K p with the inconsistent formulas nor
with run of the mill conjunctions like p $ q. The idea is simple: what
formulas like >p$K p require is a change of the epistemic landscape
midway through, and that shift prevents the resulting state from
supporting the modal in the first conjunct. And that means that there is
no single non-empty state which can support the whole conjunction at
once. More formally: say that a formula ’ 2 L> is cohesive iff there is a
non-empty state s such that s í ’, i.e. such that s j ’ = ’.30 And so
something like >p$K p, not being cohesive, isn’t really the kind of thing
that an agent can have as a commitment. Strictly speaking, it can only be
a sequence of commitments. So, there is no mistake here; we shouldn’t
expect, nor want, í to be reflexive in the general case.
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Starting with two pretty simple ideas Y that simple-minded updates can
inform us in getting straight about epistemic commitment, and that these
updates might have a non-trivial dynamics of their own, we end up with a
consequence relation with all the right features for modeling rational
epistemic commitment for ideally reflective agents: it predicts that agents
really are reflective in their commitments, that modals express global
properties of their states, and that their commitments based on such global
properties do not always persist. What is left is to put such a consequence
relation to work in belief dynamics.
7. OFF-THE-SHELF NON-TRIVIALITY
So far I have argued that we should reject the doxastic conservative’s (P)
by rejecting the idea that rational epistemic commitment in the context of
might is persistent. This, I think, is the favored escape route to our
problem. In place of a persistent consequence relation we have an
independently motivated dynamic relation which gets us what we should
want from epistemic modals. We can, and with striking ease, put such a
dynamic consequence relation to work in revision models. In fact, since
the specific details of a revision function run largely orthogonal to our
main concern here, we can point to a rather broad class of revision
models which, with the help of our dynamic notion of consequence,
avoid triviality.
The recipe will be to take any one of a broad class of extant revision
models for CPL. Identify its consequence relation, drop it from the model,
and put î in its place. The result will be a model for L> that is non-
trivial, preservative in its non-modal fragment, and completely reflective.
There is a range of candidate revision functions, and motivations for
them, to be found (see, e.g., Spohn, 1988; Grove, 1988; Katsuno and
Mendelzon, 1991). Since such functions are reminiscent of the Stalna-
kerYLewis semantics for conditionals, I call them Bbroadly conditional^
revision functions.
DEFINITION 7.1. Consider any s 2 I. A partial ordering es over W is
an s-implausibility ordering iff for any w 2 s:
(1) for any w0 2 W, w es w0; and
(2) for any w0 =2 s, w0 :s w.
Let min(’, es) be the set of worlds w 2 g’Ä such that no w0 2 g’Ä is
strictly less s-implausible than w. A revision function ) : I  CPL Y I is
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broadly conditional iff for any s and ’ 2 CPL there is an s-implausibility
ordering es such that s ) ’ = min(’, es).
It is easy to see that revision models based on such broadly condi-
tional revision functions, coupled with our dynamic consequence
relation, satisfy (S), (ER), and (C). The consequence relation ensures that
the modals are reflective and that the model satisfies (R) on that score.
Provided the space of possibilities W is non-trivial, they also satisfy the
requirement codified in (NT) that rationality does not rule out
uncertainty.
PROPOSITION 7.1. Let M = bI, í, )À be a revision model for L>, where
) is a broadly conditional revision function, and consider any ’ 2 CPL
and s 2 I.
(1) (S) s ) ’ í ’.
(2) (ER) If s ] K’ then s ) ’ = s 7 g’Ä.
(3) (C) If g’Ä m ; then s ) ’ m ±.
(4) (NT) If W is non-trivial, i.e., if there are two distinct possibilities,
then M is non-trivial.
Proof. For reference, here are the relevant details (omitting (4)).
(1) Note that s ) ’ = min(’, es) and so s ) ’  g’Ä. Since ’ 2 CPL we
know that for any s0 whatever s0 j ’ = s0 7 g’Ä, and so clearly (s )
’) j ’ = s ) ’, and thus s ) ’ í ’.
(2) Suppose s ] K’, for an arbitrary ’ 2 CPL. Since ’ 2 CPL, this
implies that s 7 g’Ä m ;. Now, s ) ’ = min(’, es) for some
s-implausibility ordering es. We first show that min(’, es)  s 7
g’Ä. Assume w =2 s 7 g’Ä. If w =2 g’Ä, then it follows straightaway
that w =2 min(’, es). So suppose w 2 g’Ä but w =2 s. We need to
show that there is a w0 2 g’Ä such that w0Gs w. Since s 7 g’Ä m ;,
let w0 2 s 7 g’Ä. By construction of es, it then follows that w0Gs w,
as required. To see that s 7 g’Ä  min (’, es) consider an arbitrary
w 2 s 7 g’Ä. Again, the construction of es gives us that w is
minimal in es (since w 2 s), and so must be in min(’, es).
(3) Suppose g’Ä m ;. Since, for ’ 2 CPL, s ) ’ = min(’, es) it is
immediate that s ) ’ m ;. (And, it doesn’t take much to see that, if
a state s m ;, then {’ : s í ’} is consistent). 5
(P) should have no purchase on our intuitions precisely because the
natural way of thinking about the contours of rational commitment, when
it comes to reflective agents, forces us to model commitment with a
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consequence relation that is not persistent. But pairing any such broadly
conditional revision function with í does give us a model preservative
in its non-modal fragment. That is, where ) is broadly conditional the
following holds:
PCPLð Þ : For any s 2 I ; ’ 2 CPL : if s:’ then Bs \ CPL
 Bs’ \ CPL
The reason is simple: ) is preservative over CPL, and í respects classical
satisfaction over the non-modal fragment.
This is a diagnosis, moreover, with some real teeth. There is, it turns
out, a rather large and varied class of revision functions which, when
coupled with a sensible notion of commitment, make for non-trivial
revision models in the presence of might. And we have a clear prediction
for when, and explanation for why, (P) leads us astray. This is progress.
8. CODA: CONTRACTING EXPANSIONS AND PRESERVING PRESERVATION
The lesson I want to draw from the Fuhrmann Impossibility Theorem is
that epistemic commitment concerning modals is a dynamic affair, and
this dynamics is a difference which makes all the difference when we put
such a relation to work in belief revision models. Further, we have been
able to squeeze quite a bit out of a single phenomenon about might. Four
antecedently plausible theses Y persistence, the doxastic conservative’s
(P), distributivity of simple-minded updates, and the natural extension of
the propositional containment analysis of epistemic commitment Y fell in
one stroke. While this is not quite the same feat as seven in one blow, it
does mean that my way with the Fuhrmann result has a robustly unified
flavor.
When our topic is a triviality result, lessons are tied to escape routes.
And since my escape route is not the only one possible, my lesson is not
the only one on offer. I want to briefly sketch two other lessons in the
vicinity, and say just a bit about how they relate to mine. Both alternative
lessons have something right in them. But that kernel is best got at by
way of the story I have been telling.
The triviality result we have been considering forces us to rethink some
issues about the relationship between the doxastic conservative’s (P) and
the rational constraints on ideally reflective agents. The first of the
alternative lessons, advocated primarily by Hans Rott (1989), suggests
that the deep problem the Fuhrmann result reveals is lurking beneath (P).
We have assumed all along, he says, that the easy (limit) cases of
revision reduce to simple-minded updates of the sort codified by AGM-
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style belief set expansion and set intersection of a state with a proposition.
Such an assumption straightaway yields a version of Preservation, and so
has got to go when we have introspectively rational agents. What this
reveals is an incoherence of the concept of an Bexpansion^ and
Bcontraction^. He argues that Bit does not make good sense any more
to speak of Fexpansions_ and Fcontractions_....[G]enuine expansions and
contractions simply do not exist. The only kinds of belief or theory
change are revisions^ (Rott, 1989, p. 109). He goes on to argue that we
should define the simple-minded update with ’ as the revision by 5’,
and define the contraction with respect to ’ as the revision by >K’.
This lesson is not altogether the right one. First, it is just not so that if
the easy (limit) case of revision reduces to simple-minded updating we
get (P). We saw above that (ER) is not only a near platitude, but that it
can only lead to (P) and the Fuhrmann problem if we think that
commitment is persistent. But it just can’t be in the context of might.
Second, there is ample room in conceptual space for a taxonomy of
epistemic change operations that recognizes weakenings, simple-minded
updates (in which there is no attempt to maintain/restore consistency
should things go awry), and genuine revisions (or, if you like, non-
simple-minded updates). Part of the task of a theory of epistemic change
is to investigate what various instantiations of these broad categories
may and must look like. We ought to be suspicious of any lesson which
denies the existence of one or more of these categories. Third, when we
turn to a fully general story about epistemic change with epistemic
modals we will want our revision function defined for inputs like >’.
And when we do we will surely want to have that a state revised by >’
amounts to a weakening of that state with respect to K’. But this should
not be definitional, it should rather be a consequence of such a theory.
But there is something right in Rott’s lesson. Much of the moral he
wants to draw turns on distinguishing AGM expansion from what he calls
Badditions^, revisions in the limiting case, or as we might say, consistent
revisions. We know that expansion (or set intersection, in worlds-talk)
induces only a trivial dynamic. But it is an open and substantive question
what additions should look like, and maybe they won’t induce a trivial
dynamic. This is close to the truth of the matter, I think, since a good
story about simple-minded-updates in our modal context won’t give us a
trivial dynamic either. And with such a story, we showed how we could
get ourselves a more reasonable concept of commitment. But we need not
Y indeed, ought not Y abandon (ER) to get it.
Now to the second alternative lesson.31 One might well wonder what
all the fuss about might really comes to. The moral is simple: we can,
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and ought to, preserve Preservation Y our preservation condition (P) is
just fine so long as we understand that it is meant only to apply to beliefs
expressible in CPL. So restricted, of course, we have no threatening
triviality result. The lesson is that the modals are merely epiphenomena,
and if we take care to cast our revision model carefully with respect to
the non-modal fragment, then the modals should remain well-behaved.
There is a sense in which I think this is just right. The behavior of the
modals should be determined by the behavior of the non-modals, and we
have shown that that is one thing that makes basically reflective relations
well-behaved is that they are grounded in this sense. What I have done is
given this suggestion an independent motivation and codification in
terms of a dynamic consequence relation. And, if we pair that relation
with an off-the-shelf revision function, we get a model satisfying
something like Preservation for the non-modal fragment. It is better, I
say, to predict the shortcomings of (P) by getting clear about the prop-
erties of the consequence relation meant to model epistemic commitment
than to stipulate its restricted scope.
But there is another sense in which I think this moral is not quite
right. Lurking behind it seems to be the idea that restricting Preservation
is obviously the right move to make, and it was just a mistake to ever
think it applied more widely than that. Put less diplomatically: the
Fuhrmann result is a non-problem. The trouble is, I think, that
restricting (P) to CPL in this way drains it of much of its philosophical
significance. It is meant to make precise the doxastic conservative’s
slogan for rational changes in view.32 Without such a substantive inter-
pretation of (P), it is hard to see the doxastic conservative as advancing
something interesting Y without such a substantive (P), for instance,
Harman’s arguments against foundationalist belief revision lose their
normative force (Harman, 1984). I am no fan of either (P) or
Preservation Y for lots of reasons Y but I think those who are fans are
staking themselves to a substantive claim. And so a proper reaction to
the Fuhrmann result ought not have the consequence that (P) is wrong
for trivial reasons. It is better, I say, to draw the moral that doxastic
conservatism ought not have the sort of wholesale purchase on our
intuitions that many have thought.
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NOTES
1 It is, of course, at the center of the AGM model of belief revision (Alchourrón et al.,
1985; Gärdenfors, 1988) and probabilistic versions of it at the center of the Bayesian
tradition (Gärdenfors, 1988, Chapter 5).
2 Two quick terminological stipulations here. First, the relevant sense of might is both
epistemic and solipsistic: it is an expression of relative possibility Y of what, in view of
the information I have, might be the case. With that said, we can drop the modifying Bin
view of^ phrase in what follows. This sense of might corresponds to what Levi (1979)
calls Bserious possibility.^ It is not, and should not be confused with, an expression of
metaphysical possibility like It didn’t rain today, but it might have. Second, talk of
Bcommitments[, rather than just beliefs, is a way of making sure we don’t beg any
questions about whether these modals can or cannot be the proper objects of belief. Levi,
for one, does not think that such modals are the kind of things that bear truth-values and
so cannot be the object of belief; Gibbard seems to have a similar view (he thinks such
modal expressions, like indicative conditionals, do not express propositions in the normal
sense). But when I hold, in view of what information I have, that It might be raining, it
seems all too belief-like to me not to count as a belief. So I am happy to say that they are
beliefs and then adjust what we must mean by Bbelief[ if need be. But others are less
permissive. Hence the talk of commitment.
3 See Levi (1988); Fuhrmann (1989); Rott (1989). I will follow Hansson (1999) and
call this triviality result the BFuhrmann Impossibility Theorem.^
4 Of course, since our topic is epistemic change any (contingent) belief is in principle
a belief which may be given up, and so is in a sense defeasible. But this muddies our
waters. Defeasibility ought, at least in this context, be thought of as a property marked by
the way a belief is justified, not its status with respect to possible revision. An agent has a
defeasible belief in p, an expectation that p, if she believes p on the basis of a defeasible
rule (e.g., Normally p). Our ordinary concept of belief is, I think, ambiguous between
acceptances and expectations Y and it is a difference that makes a difference in belief
dynamics generally. See, for example, Rott (2001) and Gillies (2004b) for two (very
different) views on the matter. But this hidden structure in our ordinary belief talk won’t
enter into things here. So, having acknowledged the distinction, I propose that we ignore
it.
5 The classic references: Fuhrmann (1989); Rott (1989). Levi (1988) is the notable
exception who goes the other direction.
6 Let CPL be generated from a fixed set of atomic formulas {p, q,...} plus conjunction
($) and negation (K) in the usual way.
7 So the revision models of interest here will be triples ; f ;Rh i, where S is the set of
epistemic states, R   Lþ, and f : S  CPL Y S. In a syntactic model Y like the AGM
model, where epistemic states are just identified with the (full) set of beliefs of the agent
Y we can drop the reference to R since it just amounts to set-membership.
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8 The AGM theory being the well-known benchmark for theories of epistemic change
Alchourrón et al. (1985); Gärdenfors (1988). This is the way that Levi (1988), Fuhrmann
(1989), Rott (1989), and Hansson (1999) all discuss the triviality result.
9 A belief set is consistent iff for no formula ’ 2 L+ is it the case that both ’ and K’
are elements of it.
10 We can already see that there is trouble on the horizon: belief sets that are closed
under Poss are saturated, i.e., they have no consistent proper supersets that extend them
in objective beliefs and are closed under Poss. Proof: Suppose K1 Î K2, where both are
closed under Poss. Then there is a ’ 2 CPL such that ’ 2 K2 and ’ =2 K1. Since Poss(K1)
 K1, >K’ 2 K1, and so >K’ 2 K2. But ’ 2 K2 and Poss(K2)  K2, and so 5’ 2 K2. So
K2 is inconsistent.
11 Autoepistemic theories were first investigated by Stalnaker, and then by Moore, in
the early 1980s (Stalnaker, 1993; Moore, 1985).
12 That is, M is the class of models M such that M is a revision model for L+ and M =
bI, î, )À where î is basically reflective and ) : I  CPL Y I.
13 See Levi (1988).
14 This way with the trouble seems to confine us to a picture of revision that in
principle cannot be extended to allow for revising in response to modal information. That
seems a mistake, and so we ought to be skeptical about it Y if I antecedently think my
favorite café is closed but you tell me that it might be open (and I know that you have
just come in from walking down the very street where that café is), I may very well want
to revise my picture of things accordingly. This looks like a case where the revision is
with respect to an epistemic modal, and a case where post-revision I ought to be
committed to that new bit of modal information. This reason for finding Levi’s strategy
wanting on this point is rather similar to the LeviYGärdenfors divergence about nested
conditionals (Levi, 1988; Gärdenfors, 1988).
15 There are other, related, escape routes one might try at this point. One might, for
instance, argue that our basically reflective relations don’t get us into any trouble at all if
we just recognize that modal commitments are time-sensitive and that the proper
representation is to put the time into the commitment: an agent in a state s is committed
to >tp. Then, at a posterior t0, when her state s0 commits her to Kp, she is committed to
K>t0p; but she can be faithful to (P) by retaining her commitment to >tp. And this is
perfectly consistent since it is obvious that >tp and K>t0p are not incompatible. But this is
unsatisfying. First, it appeals to expressive resources in the object language that,
following the tradition in the modeling of belief dynamics, I have been assuming we
don’t have. Second, it proves too much. If we allow such expressive resources for
modals, then it is hard to resist the move for non-modal information. Put the time into the
commitment: agents have beliefs like pt and qt*, representing that they believe p at t and
q at t*. But then we can avoid the call for non-trivial revision in the non-modal fragment
altogether. An agent can be certain that p at t, and then certain that Kp at a posterior t0
without having to revise at all. This is perfectly consistent since it is obvious that pt and
Kpt0 are not incompatible.
16 This particular strain of orthodoxy is due to Fuhrmann.
17 In the AGM framework, a weakening is a contraction function; in a possible worlds
framework, Bcontraction^ is a pretty awful description of what happens V it makes more
sense to call such operations downdates. The neutral term Bweakening^ covers both.
18 The relevant version of the Levi Identity is just this: K j ’ =(K õ K’) + ’, where
K + ’ = Cn(K ? {’}); the relevant vacuity constraint on weakenings (contractions) is
just that if ’ =2 K then K õ ’ = K. These two conditions are indeed enough to get us
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(PAGM). Proof: Suppose K’ =2 K, and consider K j ’. By the Levi Identity K j ’ = (K õ
K’) + ’ and the vacuity constraint gives us that K õ K’ = K. Thus K j ’ = K + ’, and
this will clearly contain all the prior beliefs in K since Cn is monotonic.
19 Strictly speaking, a model satisfies (LI) with respect to a choice for ,.
20 See, e.g., Gärdenfors (1988); Grove (1988).
21 See note 18. I’ve just put that diagnosis in a possible worlds framework.
22 Given a state s, we first formed a stable autoepistemic theory Ks, and then defined
î+ as: s î+ ’ iff ’ 2 Ks.
23 See Veltman (1985, 1996). Persistence and monotonicity are related: if î is
persistent, and we define a notion entailment in terms of it in the normal way, then that
entailment relation will be monotonic in the normal sense.
24 Non-persistent consequence relations for epistemic modals (and epistemic condi-
tionals) is a familiar theme in dynamic semantics: see Veltman (1985, 1996); van der
Does et al. (1997); Gillies (2004a).
25 This is analogous to Gibbard’s view about indicative conditionals (Gibbard, 1981).
See also Gillies (2004a).
26 AGM expansion is one such operator, as is set intersection of a prior state with a
non-modal content g’Ä, as is the update function I will define below.
27 This Btest^ behavior of modals is a motivating intuition for Update Semantics. See
Veltman (1996); van der Does et al. (1997); Groenendijk et al. (1996); van Benthem
(1996). This picture of modals is generalized (though not for the case of epistemic
modals) with an accommodation mechanism in Gillies (2003).
28 This is a so-called Bupdate-to-test^ consequence relation. It is worth pointing out
that this one, however, does not have all of the structural properties as similar dynamic
consequence relations do, in particular, those in van der Does et al. (1997), since I allow
modals to occur within the scope of conjunctions, negations, and other modals.
29 This captures the classical concept of consistency for the non-modal fragment as a
special case: for if ’ 2 CPL then there is an s such that s j ’ m ; iff g’Ä m ;.
30 This is the same property that Groenendijk et al. (1996) call Bcoherence^. It is easy
to see that cohesiveness implies consistency but not vice versa.
31 This has been advanced by, among others, David Makinson. Levi advocates
something like this in various passages in his Levi (1988). His official line there,
however, is denying (RAGM).
32 To be sure, this is not Levi’s view. But it does, I think, fairly characterize the
conservative intuitions of the likes of Harman, Gärdenfors, and others.
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